Is islamophobia fuelling the success of the Vlaams Belang?

Who are the Vlaams Belang?

The Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) emerged from the post-war flemish nationalist Volksunie as a protest against its perceived moderate line and participation with mainstream Belgian parties. Like the modern Nieuw Vlaamse Alliantie, which emphasises evolutionary change towards Flemish independence, the Volksunie was not extreme enough for the Vlaams Belang, or Vlaams Blok as it was known at that time. Initially it was not afraid of the neo-fascist label and particularly under the leadership of Filip Dewinter, was known for street battles and direct action. After prosecution for racism, the party reformed as the Vlaams Belang, with little actual change to method or policy. After initial growth, the party was heavily impacted by the strength of the NVA in the 2014 elections and lost much of its support. The Vlaams Belang has, however, experienced much greater electoral success under its young leader Tom Van Grieken, who took over in 2014. A communications strategy that has mixed islamophobia, accusations of elitism and corruption against the governing parties and promotion of the Flemish language has lead to a recovery of their fortunes. They now have the largest share of the vote in Flanders, currently polling at just under 25%.

The far-right, anti-semitic or islamophobic?

Many far-right parties across Europe have sought to drop their anti-semitic rhetoric and focus on what they see as a more pressing issue for their people, that of the growing presence of Islam. In 2010 a group of far right leaders, including the Vlaams Belang traveled to Israel to sign an agreement, the so-called “Jerusalem declaration” to formally move away from anti-semitism, which was seen as tainted after the second world war. As a result, anti-Muslim sentiment seems to have emerged as a new outlet for their culture clash rhetoric, the policy of creating the myth of a homogenous indigenous group, that is under siege. The combination of islamophobia, accusations against the government status quo as corrupt and a patronising elite that ignores the culture and priorities of “ordinary people”, has proved extremely powerful. In the 2019 elections, the Vlaams Belang formed largest party in Flanders. As most parties in Belgium only cover either the French speaking territory or the Flemish speaking (the Marxist PDVA being the only exception), this was a major victory.

Islamophobia and communication strategy

The aim of the Vlaams Belang in terms of their communications strategy is to create a news environment that re-enforces a view of the world which is about elite corruption, betrayal and the threat of islam. Interestingly, their main focus is not directly on independence, although that is, of course, a background issue that everyone understands is part of their ideology. They are not a traditional political party, but rather use a model of mass membership, grass roots activism and a strongly controlled centre, to avoid having to compromise with traditional parties. Since 2010, and renewed this year, there is a “cordon sanitaire” agreement amongst the mainstream parties of not including the Vlaams Belang in any debates or conversation, let alone coalitions. This has worked  well in keeping them out of the mainstream media, so the Vlaams Belang’s response has been to create its own news media universe. This is based around their own app, which calls people to participate through the slogan “Breek Zelf de Censuur”, (Break the censorship
yourself). The very act of downloading the app is positioned as a rebellion against the lies of the elite. The app is now at the heart of their communication strategy as they position themselves as  representing not only the older Flemish population, but also younger people.

The islamophobia of the Vlaams Belang has developed since a young Tom Van Grieken, before he became party leader, invaded a school barbecue in Flanders in 2012 to distribute pork to all the children. This was a protest against the fact that the school had advertised Halal meat would be available as a choice for Muslim students. That kind of political stunt appealed to the hardline Vlaams Belang supporters and managed to break their message into the mainstream press, but may have had less appeal to undecided voters, or more moderate NVA separatists. Now, following a common strategy with many European neo-fascists, the message of Islamophobia is woven into a more complex communication of reverse victimisation of white people by corrupt liberal elites who are wasting money on foreigners whose culture is completely at odds with their way of life.

Tom Van Grieken stands outside a school he has just entered to give pork to all students including Muslims. (Source Knack magazine 2012) 

The experience of using the app reinforces this world view. At time of writing, the scroll experience takes you through a podcast with a famous footballer, who talks about his opposition to repatriation of Islamic State widows, an article on the need for lower petrol prices, a very popular subject, how EU “elite” are undermining the integrity of the border policy, two Niqab clad women are seen walking away from the camera, as the title calls for a ban on repatriating IS women. There is the summary of the far right Dutch leader Geert Wilders (PVV) being banned from holding meetings in a strongly Turkish area of Brussels  and a picture of a crowd of what appear to be asylum seekers with the provocative headline “Minder leefloon = minder migratie”, (lower social assistance = less immigration). Four words and a picture of a crowd summing up a belief that immigrants (who in the picture are brown and mostly wearing head coverings, and therefore assumed to be Muslim) are only coming for social benefits. This is one of the strengths of Vlaams Belang's communications, they can sum up complex and highly debatable statements in slogans that the faithful will not challenge. The photo seems to have been sourced from reports about refugees on the Serbian border and repurposed to suggest crisis in Belgium.

Social media

More than any other party in Flanders, the Vlaams Belang has grasped the importance of social media and tailoring a dramatic and divisive message to that medium. According to the national Dutch language newspaper De Morgen, in an article on the 2019 election entitled “Hoe Vlaams Belang via Facebook de verkiezingen won” (How the Vlaams Belang won the election via Facebook), they note that despite only having 21,000 members (which is very large for a Belgian political party), their Facebook page has more than 400,000 followers, more than double that of their nearest rival the NVA. They also spent the most, with a budget of €617,000, €125,000 of which was spent on Facebook adverts in the week before the election. 

The flow of news on the Vlaams Belang Facebook page is very similar to that on the app, with both heavily featuring an anti-islam and anti-immigration message. Both also prominently feature a regular ten-minute chat show format video with their mix of messages and issues. 

The Vlaams Belang also, however, made the decision to include a maverick neo-Nazi in their electoral list, Dries Van Langenhove. This seems to have been on the principal that along with the careful weaving of a media message, there needed to be a shock element that keeps them in the news. Van Langenhoven was the founder of a neo-fascist student group, “Schild en Vrienden”. This group grew as an online, social media-based phenomenon, particularly on twitter. Van  Langhoven commonly expressed extreme anti-muslim sentiment, for example tweets such as:

“Ik heb een heel goede en concrete maatregel tegen “islamofobie”: Beste moslimlanden, breng jullie uitgezonden moslims terug naar huis”

(“I have a very good and concrete measure against 'Islamophobia': Dear Muslim countries, bring your exiled Muslims back home”).

Schild en Vrienden members involved in the attack on a refugee project.

He also organised violent direct action. In 2018 a group of his followers from Schild en Vrienden attacked a new project assisting refugees in Gent. This lead to national interest in his activities. Van Langhoven is an expert in extreme, shocking online and offline actions that attract the coverage of the national media, which is why the Vlaams Belang quickly moved him into their party, where he won a substantial majority in the 2019 election. They have realised that a maverick who attracts attention, far from losing them votes, focuses media on the issues that they want to be central to the election debates.  

There is an ongoing legal process against Schild en Vrienden which is much more explicitly neo-Nazi than the Vlaams Belang, and against Van Langhoven for actual violence, carrying offensive weapons (pepper spray) and for creating race hate and homophobia. Some commentators believe that his alt-right rhetoric will move the Vlaams Belang further from the mainstream and cause  their support to reduce. So far, the storm of publicity has had the opposite effect. 

Image posted by Schild en Vrienden

Sweden as a picture of the failure of multiculturalism

Picture used on the front cover of the Vlaams Belang magazine.

The background to this story is completely hidden. The reporting is used to illustrate their claim that “het multiculturalisme een gefaald experiment is” (multiculturalism is a failed experiment). The story has no names, no individuals at all on either side, except for a VB member of the Flemish parliament. The effect of removing all details and all names is to universalise the incidents, to imply that they are not unusual, but rather are the normal and expected outcome of foolish policies. Islam is seen as the root of disorder and the feared  “islamitische jongemannen” (young muslim men) are again stigmatised. There is a deliberate phrasing that implies that there were planned and deliberate attacks on authority that could not have been avoided “Doelbewuste aanvallen op de politie bleven niet uit” (Deliberate attacks on the police were inevitable). Why inevitable? Because we are being told that in a situation of culture clash, multiculturalism is weakness and will be taken advantage of by “islamitische jongemannen”.To analyse a specific article, there is a text and photograph that was posted on the Vlaams Belang website on  April 19th 2022 on the subject of muslim versus police riots in Sweden, under the title “‘Multicultureel paradijs’ Zweden eet zichzelf op”, (Multicultural paradise Sweden is eating itself.) The post has a picture of a burning car and in the margin there is an advert for the Vlaams Belang magazine, which  features two white children who are looking for chocolate eggs in an easter egg hunt. The use of pictures is interesting, because it sets the alleged impact of Islam (the burning car) against the “western  paradise” of white children in a rural setting.  The Vlaams Belang walks a delicate line in that it is pro western cultural Christianity, but is not allied to the Catholic church and often speaks of the European enlightenment which they say is superior to the “barbarism” of Islam. The choice of a family easter egg hunt is  therefore a cultural statement, not particularly a religious one. The picture of the burning car sums up their image of Islam as a violent and illogical cultural system. Interestingly, the picture is not from riots in Sweden, but seems to have originated in the US and has been used as a stock photo in many articles on public order. It is common for the Vlaams Belang to use stock pictures out of context. Even the photograph of the children on an Easter Egg hunt with the added slogan“Bescherm onze tradities” (Protect our traditions) is a Getty Images photograph that has been used multiple times in the UK. It is perhaps being suggested that this is a specifically a Flemish tradition, but in fact is not exclusive to Flanders.

Burning car image used with the story about Sweden published by the Vlaams Belang.

The fuller story is reported by other news sources, including this excerpt from Sky News:

“At least three people were shot by police during protests against a far-right group in Sweden.

Riots have broken out across the country in recent days after Danish far-right politician Rasmus Paludan planned to carry out Koran burnings in various towns and cities.

On Sunday, a crowd of about 150 people threw stones at police officers and set fire to cars in the eastern city of Norrkoping. Mr Paludan and his Stram Kurs party had organised a demonstration in the area but never showed up, Swedish media reported.”

So, in effect, a far right stunt has fed the propaganda of other far right political parties, this time in Flanders. More than that, the text produced by the Vlaams Belang has been woven into a strategy of depicting the state as corrupt, elitist and following a failed dream of multiculturalism that has ended in violence against the homogenous, indigenous population. The local citizens become victims, as do the police. The name of the Stram Kurs party does not, appear anywhere in the Vlaams Belang’s own article.

The Diyanet Mosque in Beringen

The case of the Diyanet mosque in Beringen, a small mining town in Limburg in the east of Flanders, illustrates well the way the Vlaams Belang mobilises quickly around a news story that seems to confirm its political point of view, both digitally, at a grass roots level and in parliament. It also shows that the response of rival political parties is less adapted to rapid and strong reaction, particularly when the Vlaams Belang is using islamophobia to drive a story. 

On April 6th 2017 news broke that a former Imam of the Diyanet mosque in Beringen had been named by the Belgian security services as an agent of the Turkish secret police, in particular reporting information around the attempted coup by Gülen against the Erdogan regime. It is unclear where this news story emerged from. The Vlaams Belang had long argued that the Diyanet network of mosques was in fact a front for an encroachment on Flemish territory by the Turkish government. This fits with their underlying strategy of describing Islam as a foreign force attempting to undermine Flemish culture, tradition and way of life. The Vlaams Belang publicity swung into action, first of all spreading the news story through its app and social media outlets, and then through statements in parliament that the rival, more moderate, Flemish separatist party the NVA, who held the relevant ministerial positions, had failed by not withdrawing recognition and support from the mosques in the entire Diyanet group, a total of 13 mosques across the region. This was an important and deeply symbolic call. In Belgium, all faith organisations, if they fulfil certain criterion of numbers of congregants and compliance with Belgian law, are financially supported by the state. Thus, Flemish tax payers’ money is used to support Muslims, which is something that the Vlaams Belang is strongly opposed to. The strength of the system is that it establishes that there isn’t one church or faith that is above any other, all are supported and welcomed. Clearly, this is something that the Vlaams Belang wants to undermine. Although it is not a Catholic organisation, preferring to talk generally about “Christian Europe” and “Enlightenment values”, its main enemy is Islam, which it has take as a target to rally around. When it speaks about the Diyanet mosques, it uses the language of human rights, to create a feeling of the barbarous east pitted against democratic Europe. For example the article it published on its own website on April 7th 2017 says:

“Deze Turkse staatsmoskeeën zijn duidelijk niet enkel gebedshuizen maar ook voorposten van het mensenrechtenvijandige Erdogan-regime en als dusdanig staatsgevaarlijk.”

(These Turkish state mosques are clearly not only houses of prayer, but also outposts of the Erdogan regime, which is an enemy to human rights, and therefore a threat to the state.).

Diyanet mosques are named as Turkish state mosques, as if this meant they are outposts of a foreign government, when in fact they are connected to the Turkish state in a similar way that an Anglican church in Belgium is connected to the British government, administering and overseeing worship for those who speak English. In a similar way, the Diyanet mosques administrate and oversee Islam for Turks abroad. The sentence then minimises the perceived threat of muslim prayer, which on other occasions they would attack as against Flemish culture. Here the Vlaams Belang are intent on the political aspect. There is, they say, control from Erdogan, the Turkish President, whose intention is to remove human rights. Europe, again, is seen as the home of human rights, which are under threat from Muslims. There is a play on fear and a call not only to remove the recognition of the Beringen mosque, but of all mosques in the Diyanet. The target of the article is not, actually, the mosques, but the minister responsible. The rhetoric ups the stakes:

“Minister Homans trekt de erkenning in van één Diyanetmoskee als politieke stunt, terwijl ze alle instrumenten in handen heeft om de erkenning van álle 13 Diyanetmoskeeën in te trekken en daarmee ook een einde te maken aan hun subsidiëring.”

(Minister Homans will withdraw the recognition of one Diyanet mosque as a political stunt, while she has all the instruments in her hands to withdraw the recognition of all 13 Diyanet mosques and thus also end their subsidies.)

Suddenly what is at stake is the fundamental principal of recognition of all religions as equal and each institution judged on an individual basis. If Minister Homans follows the law, she will be seen as weak. The Vlaams Belang have used the digital news platform and their presence in parliament to put pressure on the government and to influence the public.

Interestingly, the following day, the Belgian security services denied ever having sent information regarding the former Imam of Beringen Diyanet Mosque. The publicity regarding this turn of events was an interview given by Meral Özcan, a member of the “Groen” party in Beringen, who called for an apology from Minister Homans. This was published on a regional news platform and was far too small a response to counteract the myth that the Vlaams Belang had managed to establish. 

https://www.hbvl.be/cnt/dmf20170407_02822483

The pressure on the minister did not decrease, and in July 2017 the recognition of the mosque in Beringen was eventually withdrawn on the grounds that a letter which the mosque had sent called the Gülen movement a terrorist network and because this was seen as sowing discord amongst peoples, the recognition of the mosque was withdrawn, a clear damage limitation exercise from the centre right separatist NVA. It was a political victory for the Vlaams Belang. Their strategy to establish the myth of foreign encroachment on rights and freedoms in Europe through mosques had, without basis in fact, been established in the public mind.

The next part of the strategy was to get the grassroots membership to march in the streets against anything the Diyanet did. So, for example, as recently as July 2021, the party organised a march in Mol, a small town near Antwerp, against a Diyanet mosque moving to bigger premises on the grounds that it was a front for Turkish government activity.

https://www.nieuwsblad.be/cnt/dmf20210730_96894051

The strategy seems to have been to use a spurious news report, which could possibly even have been created by the Vlaams Belang in the first place, to put an impossible demand on their rival political party, making them look weak on immigration whilst allowing the myth that islamic places of prayer are advanced outposts of a foreign invasion, threatening Flemish values. This strategy allows the party to avoid the charge of racism and also motivates its supporters on the streets.

Is this islamophobic strategy causing the party to grow?

The Vlaams Belang was the largest party in the last Flemish parliamentary elections in 2019, and currently polls at just under 25% of the vote. In 2019 the right to far-right alliance of NVA and   Vlaams Belang narrowly fell short of the necessary majority. As other more moderate parties refuse to work with the Vlaams Belang, it was refused as a coalition member. In 2024, they may achieve the working majority they need to form a separatist coalition (if indeed the NVA agree to work with them.). Their media strategy seems to be to weave popular and emotive issues into a world view that motivates their grass roots activists. This clusters around specific claims, firstly against a corrupt and weak elite which subsidises minorities while “ordinary Flemish people” suffer, something which the cost of living crisis is playing into. Secondly, there is an attack on multiculturalism as a failed experiment that is undermining their way of life. Finally, there is a focus on Islam as the real enemy, an issue that will mobilise their grassroots to march, recruit and finally to vote. At the moment it seems that this media strategy is working. 

When people are questioned as to why they voted for the Vlaams Belang in 2019, as was done by the national news media NWS, the answers are interesting. First of all, young people, particularly students, tend not to mention immigration, although it is a major theme in many communications from the Vlaams Belang. Perhaps it is still felt as shameful and racist to admit to such opinions. Instead, dissatisfaction is expressed with the mainstream political parties, and approval of the young leadership style of Tom Van Grieken. Older voters feel more able to express a fear about immigration, although the word “Islam” is not often used, with the issue of immigration left vague, and concern expressed about the impact on Flemish culture. This is Vlaams Belang code for opposition to Islam. What is also expressed is the opinion that “Vlaanderen is rechts” or “Flanders is right (meaning right in political terms, that is, conservative).”. This is an opinion that is often expressed, that the region is naturally conservative and votes right-wing. This is interesting, as despite the predominance of NVA and Vlaams Belang, the fact is that more people voted for centrist and socialist parties in the last election, although the vote was split amongst many parties. Thus, the idea that the region is naturally right-wing, is again a constructed myth.

The Vlaams Belang have created a media environment which connects dissatisfaction with mainstream politics and the presence of immigrants in the country. Time and again the picture is painted of money going from the pockets of hard-pressed tax payers into the hands of immigrants who are agents of a foreign culture, faith and even government. This creates an image of reverse victimhood, which motivates those who may have been reticent to express far-right views to vote for the Vlaams Belang as a protest. The country will see if this strategy continues to be successful in 2024.